Fallout from the Energy Policy Act of 2005 Pt. 2

Energy Department Trumps States' Rights

(Part 2 of A Series)

By Diane M. Grassi

As discussed in Fallout from the Energy Policy Act of 2005 Part I of a Series, the United States federal government is taking a more and more integral role in the distribution and transmission of electricity and in the energy sector throughout the U.S.

And such is the result of both federal regulations and laws mandating the deregulation of public utilities as well as the repeal of the Public Utilities Holding Company Act (PUHCA) of 1935, as mandated in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005). It will prove to have profound impacts on the future of not only the fiscal health of public utilities but the oversight of their maintenance and the future construction of transmission lines.

This Part II continuing report, on the exploration of EPAct 2005, will focus upon a section of the law which has not been clearly articulated for the American people by either the Department of Energy (DOE) or members of either the U.S. House of Representatives or the U.S. Senate. Yet, this complex and important body of law represents but an ad hoc and unilateral takeover of not only the direction of energy policy but the very delivery system which Americans rely upon in order to live.

EPAct 2005 sets forth specific mandates whose ramifications are unprecedented with respect to U.S. energy law, states' constitutional rights and sovereignty, as well as interstate commerce. Specifically, Section 1221 of EPAct 2005 updates Section 216 of the Federal Power Act (FPA).

It provides for, among other things, the requirement of a National Electric Transmission Congestion Study, first completed in August 2006, a year after enactment of EPAct 2005. Such a Congestion Study will then be repeated every 3 years thereafter.

And it is the National Transmission Congestion Study which paved the way for the mandated National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors (NIETC). According to Section 1221(a) of EPAct 2005 (Section 326 of FPA, 16 U.S.C. Section 824p) the Secretary of Energy may designate "any geographic area experiencing electric energy transmission capacity constraints or congestion that adversely affects consumers as a national interest electric transmission corridor."

And the DOE then proposed as a direct result of the study two transmission corridors which consist of the Mid-Atlantic Area National Corridor and the Southwest Area National Corridor. The draft NIETC was issued in April 2007 and finalized in October 2007 by the DOE.

Why you may not be aware of such transmission corridors and their intended purpose can be answered simply because the public and consumers of public utilities were given little or no notice of opportunities to weigh in and attend very limited public hearings, abruptly announced in May 2007 by the DOE to take place in the very same month. That gave little time for proper public notice for participation by residents, lawmakers, ratepayers and consumer advocates, to name but a few.

Even more disconcerting is that the DOE claims that EPAct 2005 does not require it to hold any public hearings regarding the NIETC. And in spite of over 2000 written comments and reports submitted to the DOE by state governors, U.S. state and federal elected representatives, consumer advocacy organizations, and environmental and historic preservation organizations, which all protested such corridors because of the lack of public input, the DOE would have none of it.

Instead, the DOE made no changes or acted upon any of the recommendations it received on its draft proposal by finalizing the NIETC in October 2007, as originally drafted.

In terms of the enormous implications in the construct of the Mid-Atlantic Area National Corridor, on paper at least, there now exists an exact list of those states which are encompassed by it and will be impacted in a variety of ways; legislatively, constitutionally, economically, environmentally and historically.

Following is a list of those states and counties designated in the Mid-Atlantic Area National Corridor: the entireties of New Jersey, Delaware, and Washington, D.C.; 22 of 24 counties in Maryland and all of Baltimore City, MD; 47 of 62 counties of New York; 7 of 88 counties of Ohio; 52 of 67 counties of PA; 15 of 95 counties and 7of 39 independent cities of Virginia; 42 of 55 counties of West Virginia.

By contrast, the Southwest Area National Corridor includes 7 of 58 counties of California and 3 of 15 counties of Arizona, albeit the most heavily populated areas of these states.

The NIETC lays the groundwork for transmission siting approval in the construct of High-Voltage Direct-Current (HVDC) Transmission lines above ground and throughout all NIETC designated states, and whether or not that particular state in fact has an electricity congestion problem. Initially problematic is that nearly the entirety of the U.S. power grid, as it presently exists, uses High-Voltage Alternating-Current (HVAC) Transmission lines and allows current to automatically reverse direction at regular intervals if necessary. HVDC requires an operator to reverse direction and its current flows in one direction only.

Only 2% of all electrical transmission line miles in the U.S. are presently HVDC. While the DOE insists that HVDC technology includes lower costs over long distances, in reality constructing HVDC lines costs more than construction of HVAC lines for short distances over a wide expanse of area. And according to the Government Accountability Office Report of February 1, 2008, (GAO-08-347R) with respect to HVDC, there will be "higher costs for short-distance lines due to the cost of equipment needed to convert DC into AC electricity used by residents and a lack of electricity benefits to consumers living along these lines –unless converter stations are installed at intermediate locations – because such lines are generally not connected to local electricity lines."

The rationalization for designation corridors is not to facilitate or dictate how the states' regions, transmission providers or electric utilities should meet their own energy challenges, according to the DOE. But truth be told, it is quite the opposite.

"The process is geared more toward expediting the approval and siting of transmission corridors than it is geared toward respecting states' rights about their residents' energy future and needs…and by a heavy-handed centralized one-size fits all approach..," according to Congressman Maurice Hinchey (D-NY). And it is precisely such sentiments that have been raised to the Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, by both federal and state lawmakers on both sides of the aisle in all 10 states and Washington, D.C. that will be directly impacted by NIETC.

And most crucial to note, EPAct 2005 enables eminent domain law over states by the federal government on a scale unlike the U.S. has ever seen.
In its effort to modernize the transmission lines infrastructure, EPAct 2005 provides for the DOE to assign the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) siting authority.

To review from Part I of this series, FERC is central to the regulation of energy policy both fiscally as well has been given oversight authority on the applications of new construction of transmission line sites.

Under Section 216(b) of EPAct 2005 –Back-Stop Siting Authority –FERC is given authority "to issue permits for the construction or modification of transmission facilities in a National Interest Electric Transmission Corridor if FERC finds that: (1)(A) a state in which the facilities are to be constructed is without authority to approve the siting of the facilities or to consider the interstate benefits expected to be achieved by the project; (B) the applicant for a permit is a transmitting utility that does qualify for a permit federally but does not qualify for a permit under state law because it does not serve end-use customers; or (C) the state has siting authority but (i) it has withheld approval for the later of one year after the filing of an application; or (ii) conditioned approval in such a way that the proposed construction will not significantly reduce transmission congestion or is not economically feasible."

And to add insult to injury, Section 216(e) of EPAct 2005 on Rights-of-Way, "If a permit holder cannot obtain the necessary rights-of-way for the project, the permit holder can acquire the rights-of-way through an eminent domain proceeding in the federal district court where the property is located."

And furthermore, in Section 216(f), "A right-of-way acquired in an eminent domain proceeding is a taking of private property for which the landowner must receive just compensation, which is the fair market value on the date of exercise of eminent domain."

Therefore, any fluctuation or rise in real estate property values during the course of the proceeding and including any period of time due to litigation arising from such a proceeding to the time of completion of the project, if finally approved, would not be taken into consideration.

And the compensation or fair market value of the property to its owner would be locked in by the date of the initial date of the proceeding, which could potentially be years, as in the case of Kelo v. City of New London, CT 545 U.S. 469 (2005).

Crucial in understanding the bone of contention raised primarily by the 10 states within the Mid-Atlantic Area and Southwest Area National Corridors, is that historically, federal jurisdiction of the siting of transmission lines in states has been reserved for federal lands within respective states. It has been the state utility commissions of each given state which have otherwise been the regulators of siting permits and applications.

And it is only reasonable to understand the indignation and concerns by state governors and state representatives to learn that FERC has been granted a new breadth of authority that many believe is counter-productive to the best interests of their respective states and citizens which they believe they know best.

As discussed in Part I of this series, with the repeal of the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935, (PUHCA) holding companies both foreign and domestic will now be the applicants for siting permits in both the Mid-Atlantic Area and the Southwest Area National Corridors for aboveground HVDC transmission lines which will range from 150-160 feet high. That is roughly three times the height of our present HVAC lines throughout the U.S. And they will cover thousands of total miles throughout NIETC, or these 10 states and Washington, D.C.

And in what could be the first official challenge to back-stop transmission authority given FERC, as prescribed by such EPAct 2005 mandate, has been pre-filed for consultation with FERC. A Southern California Edison (SCE) application to the Arizona Corporation Commission, (ACC) the public utility commission of Arizona, was rejected in May 2007 by ACC. SCE merely wanted to run a 230-mile transmission line from Arizona to California at a cost of $242 million to Arizona ratepayers. And the benefit to Arizona? None, as it would specifically be to serve Californians and their growing energy needs.

The ACC described SCE's project as "a 230-mile extension cord" into Arizona's generation supply. And likewise in his letter to Secretary Bodman in November 2007, after the NIETC was finalized, Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell wrote, "These transmission lines will be on our land and depreciate our property values, but they may not offer any benefit to Pennsylvania consumers. This designation and action by the federal government is a blatant abuse of states' rights," Governor Rendell said.

Yet, this is likely just the beginning, exemplifying a dysfunctional remedy, to "fix" the U.S. power grid and growing domestic energy needs, by way of EPAct 2005. It will essentially be a power grab for power both literally and figuratively, the sights of which the U.S. has never seen.

Part III of Fallout from the Energy Policy Act of 2005, will take a look at: the various federal and state laws which the NIETC either directly or potentially violate or conflict with; proposed or pending pieces of legislation in Congress in order to amend specific sections of EPAct 2005; and the mechanisms that the DOE and FERC either already have or expect to have in place in the future in order to maintain effective oversight of such a massive body of law and its unprecedented changes in U.S. energy policy.

Copyright ©2008 Diane M. Grassi
Contact: dgrassi@cox.net

Fallout from the Energy Policy Act of 2005

By Diane M. Grassi

(Part 1 of a Series)

"Energy independence from foreign sources."

A mantra repeated over and over again by Al Gore, by the Hollywood elite and by candidates running for the 2008 Presidential nomination. But rarely is it ever pointed out how this phrase is but an oxymoron with respect to United States energy policy, which becomes ever more vulnerable, not just as the result of its failing infrastructure, but from misguided public policy decisions.

But never is the topic broached publicly in how much of the U.S. energy infrastructure and lines of transmission have been consumed by a constant stream of foreign direct investors and diversified holding companies. Also unbeknownst to most consumers is that such activity was hailed from Wall Street to Capitol Hill as the answer to resolving U.S. energy woes.

And now those very foreign investors have been granted even greater leeway as now realized by such mandates of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) which essentially eliminated the Public Utilities Holding Company Act (PUHCA) of 1935.

And in 2007, barely after the ink dried from EPAct 2005, the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 was passed by federal lawmakers and signed into law. EISA conveniently serves to obfuscate critical issues that continue to stress the U.S. electrical power grid, its energy generation and transmission capacity. Yet, EPAct 2005 has continually escaped public scrutiny and a lack of accountability in both houses of the U.S. Congress.

But U.S. energy policy and the generation of power is a complex web of public policy, law, economics, infrastructure and ever-present globalization. So for purposes of this report, and in order to best comprehend current U.S. energy policy, it will be helpful to take stock of the more recent evolution of such and to examine its many and varied elements which have changed again post-2005.

In addition to the repeal of PUHCA 1935, EPAct 2005 amended Section 203 of the Federal Power Act (FPA) which will have an unprecedented and profound impact of its own on how future transactions in the energy industry will be handled by the federal government, impact matters of states' sovereignty and regulating costs to consumers.

For over 70 years, federal laws have played a vital and critical role in the operation, production, distribution and protection of the U.S. electrical power grid. Federal laws in concert with state laws and regulations have necessarily dictated that the power grid be shielded from market manipulation and criminal behavior.

But as the nearly 100 year old power grid has aged, facing a growing population and higher load demands for power, the industry has simultaneously become more and more deregulated by mandate.

And deregulation has led to less and less necessary preventative maintenance, upgrades in technology as well as necessary investment in research and development. And the poorly maintained grid in many of the areas of the country, predominantly the mid-Atlantic and northeast states, has but put even more stress upon its transmission lines.

The basic structure of the North American transmission system is made up of over 140 control centers and approximately 3500 utility providers covering over 200,000 miles. Utility generating plants, transmission and sub-transmission systems, distribution systems and customer loads travel over a two-part power grid; one in the east and one in the west. Texas has its own grid.

Compounding the vast network and intricacy of the grid is the interconnectivity and delivery of power that in many cases is incompatible with widely varying levels of equipment integrity, data systems and personnel training. It is the secondary system which supplies the distribution of electricity to consumers, where most of the power failures occur, and that which require time to repair.

And the network of sub-stations feeding electricity to neighborhoods, via feeders which flow to transformers, is where supposed problems arise during local outages, further exacerbated by non-maintained equipment.

But although deregulation of the utility industry began over two decades ago, it was the 1992 Energy Policy Act which changed the way electricity was sold to local consumers for the first time. Energy companies were permitted to install their own plants and sought customers throughout the country, but not necessarily in the same geographic region. Energy brokers then entered into the picture and utilized the open market to buy and sell power.

And thus began the potential unreliability of energy delivery.

Purchasing power from plants hundreds of miles away from a respective region put unprecedented burdens upon the transmission system, raising the likelihood of power failures at the local level. Most importantly, the electrical grid, as it was originally envisioned, was never designed to absorb the transmission of high voltage capacity across the continent, and especially in absence of comparable and upgraded systems in place.

Although Enron became the poster child for electrical power market manipulation, which came to light after the rolling blackouts of California in 2000 and 2001, U.S. public policy and lawmakers must be held responsible for even further erosion of federal regulations and mandates now realized in EPAct 2005.

The initial most striking change that EPAct 2005 provides is the repeal of PUHCA 1935, now amended as PUHCA 2005, and now administered by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). PUHCA 1935 became law after the height of the Great Depression and after the stock market crash of 1929 and was a cornerstone of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal industry legislation.

It called for the prohibition of market manipulation, specifically to prevent then super-sized utility conglomerates, to prevent mega-mergers and to prevent monopolies from overtaking geographic regions. And just as importantly, PUHCA 1935 made it unfeasible for non-energy corporations to purchase a public utility.

Such abuses led to severe problems in the electric and gas industry in the 1920's and in the 1930's when three utility holding companies owned one-half of the electric utilities in the entire U.S. Thus, the emergence and formation of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1934, which preceded PUHCA1935, and together became essential in safe-guarding the public trust and in protecting consumers and investors alike, as PUHCA 1935 delegated multi-state utility ownership regulation to the SEC.

Fast-forward to February 8, 2006, six months to the day of the enactment of EPAct 2005, when the official repeal of PUHCA 1935 was realized. As a direct result, the SEC vacated its regulatory authority over multi-state utility ownership by holding companies and only retains the ability to protect investors, not utility consumers or to prevent mega-mergers from consolidating. And now the FERC will assume cursory merger authority over generating plants and holding companies.

The repeal of PUHCA 1935 will not only allow multi-state transactions but also mergers of distribution facilities, utilities merging with non-utility corporations, and including foreign ownership over domestic utilities.

Furthermore, oil companies may now own electricity and natural gas utilities, paving the way, yet again, for the formation of cartels. In addition, construction and infrastructure companies, especially those from abroad, are eager to partake in being afforded carte blanche in the acquisition of U.S. public utility operations.

In the post-PUHCA 1935 era, no individual state or federal agency will have the jurisdictional teeth to effectively regulate the finances of U.S. public utility assets totaling more than one trillion U.S. dollars. Nor will there be required oversight of such holding or parent companies such as investment banks from speculating and investing in far riskier businesses, with utility rate-payer revenues. - We have already seen evidence of such with the current sub-prime mortgage loan crisis.

At cost? The reliability standards of U.S. public utilities, which could have grave ramifications on U.S. national security, the U.S. economy and the well-being and safety of the American people; all with the blessings of the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Congress and the global stock market.

To be continued in Part 2 of a Series. Next Up: Energy Department Uses Power to Trump States' Rights

Copyright©2008 Diane M. Grassi
Contact: dgrassi@cox.net

MLB Goes to Harlem Seeking Welfare

There Goes the Neighborhood!

By Diane M. Grassi

It would make one wonder if indeed MLB believes that it is but recession-proof, given the $6.75 billion dollars in revenue it took in for the 2007 MLB season and its $5.2 billion totals for 2006.

But it is a reality that less and less discretionary income is available to average or marginal baseball fans going into the 2008 MLB season. And at the same time, gas prices at the pump are expected to flirt with $4.00 a gallon.

Even so, it has not deterred MLB and two of its two major league teams from cashing in on public entitlements, courtesy of the City of New York. It is well known throughout the country that tax abatements and waived property taxes are the modus operandi for many cities and counties in order to supposedly retain major corporate conglomerates, threatening to relocate elsewhere.

That brings us to New York’s Mayor Michael Bloomberg who in 2004 gave himself credit for ending the squeeze by corporations from getting tax breaks to remain in NYC.

“We’ve essentially ended corporate welfare as we know it, by no longer paying companies -- who wouldn’t have left anyway -- to stay in our great city,” Bloomberg said back then.

But even after Mayor Bloomberg lauded himself as the anti-corporate welfare czar, monies to the tune of $650 million in city and state subsidies were given to Goldman Sachs to build its headquarters in Battery Park City, or 9/11’s Ground Zero, and $240 million were allocated in givebacks to JP Morgan Chase, also to build in lower Manhattan, after stating that it would move to Stamford, CT, and later unsubstantiated by the City of Stamford.

Under the guise of revitalizing lower Manhattan after the streets were deserted as the result of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, this ploy by Mayor Bloomberg was somehow forgivable by the legislators and politicos of NYC and New York State.

Then came the new Yankee Stadium and the new stadium for the Mets. Both the Yankees and the Mets essentially led successful swindles, as both stole home with the blessings of City Hall.

As both stadiums near the end of construction, with both planned to be ready for the 2009 MLB season, the tallying of total costs to the NYC and NY state taxpayers has begun.

On his weekly radio show on WABC New York on February 29, 2008, Mayor Bloomberg stated that, “Hey, we got a good deal at only spending $75 million each on Yankee and Shea…er..Citi Field stadiums.”
He was referring to the outlay in real costs by NYC for each of the NYC stadiums for the Yankees and the Mets.

But for the owner and founder of Bloomberg Communications and self-made billionaire, Mayor Bloomberg seems to have forgotten his arithmetic along the way. For the actual costs to the city and state of NY for the new Yankee Stadium will total over $800 million and for Citi Field, or what will be known as the new Mets stadium, $500 million has been tallied for a grand total of $1.3 billion in public funding for the two stadiums combined.

This includes tax-exempt bonds, on which the government will pay the interest, tax abatements on property taxes, new street construction, a new railroad station stop for Yankee Stadium, new car garages as well as re-construction of open space for the parks outside of Yankee Stadium, which were completely destroyed.

In fact, the residents of the area outside of Yankee Stadium, a minority community, are now without 400 trees and 21.5 acres of less park space, greenery and playing fields. Although NYC and the Yankees originally promised more parkland, they now include the top of the parking garages as open space, where playgrounds will be put.

And while there is no shortage of propaganda on the benefits that new professional sports stadiums supposedly bring to metropolitan areas, that topic alone is worthy of an additional in-depth report and a far more realistic and intelligent discussion.

And as much as MLB and its owners want to praise themselves for their reputed black ink, it comes but at the expense of taxpayers and local communities, whether they are baseball fans or not.

And more often than not, it comes at the expense of the poorer minority neighborhoods, which are but expendable to big business and to City Hall.

But the latest feat by MLB should make even bona fide global capitalists wince. For in a coup by one of the largest realty developers in the U.S., Vornado Realty Trust, has been granted by NYC’s Planning Commission a waiver to building height restrictions on 125th Street and Park Avenue, which is the main thoroughfare of the historic neighborhood known as Harlem.

In addition, Mayor Bloomberg has been campaigning to rezone the entirety of Harlem allowing massive buildings as tall as 29 stories in order to attract even more major corporate partners.

As part of the waiver to Vornado, which raises the height limit to 21 stories, or an additional four stories, in this mixed-use residential and commercial area, the building will include 630,000 square feet of office space and will contain a variety of corporate businesses.
'
With the steep rise in real estate costs in NYC, many corporate entities are willing to move uptown to save on leasing costs, even at the expense of displacing thousands of people from their residences or crushing over 70 small local businesses in the neighborhoods made up of African-Americans and Hispanic communities.

Of significance, is that those 4 extra stories, most likely to be approved by the NYC Council in the near future, will be occupied by none other than MLB and its new cable television baseball channel. MLB would occupy two floors for executive offices and the top two floors for television studios.

And the Vornado organization also gave NYC an ultimatum along with the height restriction being lifted. They said that without the additional four stories it would be a deal-breaker for them attracting MLB as an anchor tenant in its building and thereby the whole deal would be off.

But it gets even worse, as Vornado also demanded $15 million in a public funding incentive package for itself and an additional $5 million package of incentives to be paid directly to MLB by the City of NY.

Out of that $5 million package part of it would be allowed to cover the costs for redecorating Commissioner Bud Selig’s MLB headquarter offices at 245 Park Avenue, in mid-town Manhattan. This brings but new meaning to corporate-welfare.

The projection of revenue for the MLB baseball television channel, to launch in January 2009, and to be located temporarily in Secaucus, NJ, is somewhere around $550 million over its first seven years, with a guarantee of a minimum of $80 million per year during that time.

It expects between 40 and 50 million viewers upon startup and will initially carry only 26 non-exclusive live games, with the rest of the 24/7 coverage comprised of all-things-baseball.

In 2007 when MLB threatened to remove its MLB Extra Innings packages --allowing fans to pay a premium to cable providers to access many out-of-market games -- from all cable and satellite broadcasters with the exception of Direct TV, it was Senator John Kerry and the Senate Commerce Committee which pushed MLB to allow Extra Innings to continue its agreements with Time Warner Cable, Cox Communications and the Comcast Corp. and they were allowed to continue to broadcast MLB Extra Innings for the 2007 season.

However, as the result of that arrangement in 2007, an agreement was made that MLB will own a 66.6% interest in its MLB television channel with Direct TV, Time Warner, Cox and Comcast divvying up the remaining shares along with a commitment from them to carry the baseball network for the next seven years.

There is no word as of yet on the status of the MLB channel on such remaining digital and cable broadcasters as Dish TV or Adelphia Communications nor confirmation that MLB will offer the channel on basic cable television.

But MLB in its arrogance, by taking its present fan-base for granted, should be doing some real world soul-searching right about now. For after 15 years of Bud Selig’s reign of denial of illegal drugs in baseball and after the off-season MLB has suffered in light of the Mitchell Report, looking for handouts should be the last thing with which MLB should be associated.

It is bad enough that much of MLB’s revenues come by way of the very taxpayers it seeks to disenfranchise, and namely the African-American communities in the inner cities. But for it to muscle its way into Harlem’s neighborhood is more than ironic and should not merely be accepted as gentrification for a better NYC.

Some have speculated that by moving corporate jobs to Harlem, such will endear MLB to the black community it has virtually lost, both as active professional baseball players and as fans, and yet woo them back to baseball. And such speculation should be an insult to all baseball fans alike.

But until MLB makes an asserted commitment to retain its present fan-base as well as makes an investment in future generations to come, such as an in bringing African-American children and families back to MLB, it has no moral right to demand givebacks; much less in Harlem or outside of Yankee Stadium.

And perhaps a good way for MLB to make amends would be to start by using some of those givebacks to build some decent baseball fields for the kids of Harlem, rather than picking out new wallpaper patterns for its executives’ office suites.

Copyright ©2008 Diane M. Grassi
Contact: dgrassi@cox.net

MLB Given Pass By Feds

By Diane M. Grassi

Major League Baseball (MLB) and drugs. The two have been linked for decades and their relationship has never waned. The drug ingredients are different, the players acquiring them have changed and the performance benefits have been enhanced.

But MLB has not learned much in the past couple of decades when it comes to the integrity of the game, in obeying the law and in protecting the best interests of its athletes, its most precious commodity.

In 1985, Pittsburgh U.S. Attorney, J. Alan Johnson, implicated 19 MLB players for possession of and use of cocaine. Then-MLB Commissioner, Peter Ueberroth, imposed penalties on 11 of the 19, while none were criminally prosecuted. Similar to the BALCO case and to the recent Mitchell Report, the depth of the problem among athletes using cocaine or illegal drugs made for sensational headlines.

But the way in which the drug culture was arguably enabled by MLB and its subsequent punishments were laughable and was perhaps the precursor to the abuse of steroids and HGH in the 1990’s and into the 21st century.
Although it was documented at the time that at least 40% of MLB players were recreationally using cocaine in the ‘80’s, only a handful were punished. But such star players such as Keith Hernandez, Dave Parker, and Lonnie Smith were punished not by the federal government but by MLB.

They were required to perform 100 hours of community service and to avail themselves to drug testing. Four other players were suspended for 60 days. Since the drug dealers were nabbed by the feds, MLB was off the hook and essentially did what it felt was appropriate for the “good of the game.”

Fast-forward to 2003 when grand jury testimony was taken in the federal BALCO investigation involving MLB’s Jason Giambi, Barry Bonds, Gary Sheffield, Benito Santiago, Olympic medalist Marion Jones and NFL star Bill Romanowski, to name but a few of the few implicated. Again, only a handful of athletes from the entire professional athletic world were threatened and eventually given immunity, in order to take down BALCO President, Vic Conte, personal trainer, Greg Anderson and the illicit sale, distribution and administration of illegal performance enhancing substances.

Marion Jones will serve 6 months in prison neither for buying and illegally using controlled substances nor for her check fraud to the tune of $200,000.00, but for lying under oath to a federal grand jury about the use of drugs. Ditto for Barry Bonds. His scheduled perjury trial is to be held in April 2008.

The latest fiasco with “personal trainer,” Brian McNamee, former NY Mets clubhouse employee, Kirk Radomski and MLB stars Roger Clemens and Andy Pettitte following former Senator George Mitchell’s report on behalf of MLB, is but another failed attempt at exposing the so-called truth.

But truth has been absent from baseball for a very long time. Moreover, implicating only 30 active players for a grand total of 89 for using performance enhancing drugs over the past decade is not only laughable but terribly sad. Given the resources and legal expenses tallied around $20‒30 million and paid to George Mitchell’s law firm by MLB, the Mitchell Report’s omissions should raise as many eyebrows as its contents.

But more importantly is the absence of a cry for accountability from MLB by the federal government in essentially allowing it to be in the drug business. For its owners and its teams’ staff members not to admit any wrong doing is beyond arrogance. A lack of efforts to look into those areas in which there was first-hand knowledge of possible illicit drug use or non-credentialed employees working in the area of strength training was but blind neglect.

To wit, according to the Mitchell Report, San Francisco Giants General Manager, Brian Sabean, was alerted by the Giants’ staff athletic trainer, Stan Conte, that a player had asked him about whether he should buy steroids from Bonds’ personal trainer, Greg Anderson, as far back as 2002. Additionally, the Giants’ longtime equipment manager, Mike Murphy, found syringes in the locker of catcher Benito Santiago.

Conte said he reported both incidents to Sabean immediately. Sabean told Conte that if he had a problem with Bonds’ trainer he should handle it himself. But it was obvious to Conte that it was not his place to confront Barry Bonds. And apparently no one else in the Giants organization felt it was their place either, as per their MLB obligation to report illicit drug use.

Brian Sabean stated in the Mitchell Report that he “was unaware of the obligation to report drug use to the Commissioner’s Office.” Former Mets General Manager, Steve Phillips, and Kirk Radomski’s employer, also plead ignorance on reporting illicit drug use to the Commissioner’s Office. Ironically now, Phillips is paid by ESPN to analyze and to inform the public about MLB’s policies.

Greg Anderson was given full accessibility to the Giants’ clubhouse. Stan Conte did not believe it was proper let alone legal. But in order to placate Bonds, the Giants also accorded him two additional trainers, Harvey Shields and Greg Oliver. All three traveled with the team. In fact, Oliver and Shields were added to the Giants’ payroll to account for their presence in the clubhouse, whereby they could advise other players as well.

Peter Magowan, CEO and Managing Partner of the S.F. Giants asked Sabean whether the Giants “had a problem” with regard to steroids after reading the news concerning the BALCO case and Greg Anderson, according to the Mitchell Report. But Sabean told Mitchell he did not recall that conversation.

The issue was not only that of illicit drugs permeating the Giants’ locker room but the issue of personal trainers, such as Greg Anderson giving out advice about steroids. None of Bonds’ trainers were certified to give out that advice nor licensed to either dispense of or speak about drug administration. Their certifications and schooling as personal trainers is also in question.

The lack of background checks on supposed strength coaches and personal trainers was rampant in MLB until 2004 when MLB limited access to clubhouses by personal trainers and ancillary clubhouse personnel not on the payroll. Due to the BALCO case, MLB did it more for security reasons, as the vetting of a trainer’s certification and background still has many lapses, to say the least.

In 2004, Sandy Krum, former assistant athletic trainer for the Chicago Cubs, was terminated, he believes, for informing Cubs’ General Manager Jim Hendry that head athletic trainer, Dave Groeschner, was operating without an Illinois state required license.

Unlike a personal trainer, an athletic trainer works under the auspices of a medical doctor and 43 states require such a license. Additionally, athletic trainers are not authorized in Illinois or NY to give injections to players. Coincidentally, Groeschner followed Cubs Manager Dusty Baker from San Francisco. In 2005, the Cubs fired Groeschner. Dusty is now with the Cincinnati Reds.

We have heard ad naseum about the McNamee-Clemens soap opera which will be played out before the Congressional House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on February 13, 2008. But little light has been shed upon the underlying facts about how McNamee helped weave his own web, in which the Toronto Blue Jays and the NY Yankees play no small part.

McNamee earned an undergraduate degree from St. John’s University in NY where he played on the baseball team as a catcher but did not have enough talent for MLB. He then followed his father’s lead and joined the NYPD in 1990. He was an officer for three years, serving two years undercover and then quit the force. He was suspended for 30 days at the end of his service for allowing a prisoner to escape from custody, but said he took the fall for someone else.

Former St. John’s school mate, Tim McCleary, was the assistant General Manager of the Yankees in 1993 and hired McNamee as the bullpen catcher, where he stayed until 1995. McNamee then decided to get into personal training. In 1998, McCleary was hired by Toronto, and he then hired McNamee as a strength coach and where he met Roger Clemens.

He also befriended Jose Canseco who at the time was also a Blue Jay.
After Clemens was traded to NY in 1999, McNamee joined him in 2000 when the Yankees put him on the payroll as a strength coach as well until 2001, when allegations immerged of rape and illegally giving the involved woman GHB ‒the date-rape drug‒ a nearly fatal dose.

Charges were not filed as the woman did not want to pursue them supposedly because she was having an affair with one of the Yankees’ married players. But McNamee was spotted having sex with a nearly comatose woman in one of the team’s hotel pools on the night of a Devil Rays game in St. Petersburg in October of 2001. His account to police was filled with inconsistencies, including denying he was the man in the pool when spotted by security and another Yankee staffer. Again, McNamee was the victim.

GHB is illegally used by athletes to recover from strenuous workouts and was also part of McNamee’s medicine cabinet. Even so, Clemens gave McNamee the benefit of the doubt about the alleged rape. The Yankees, however, let McNamee go before the 2002 season without disclosing the reason. But Clemens hired him as his personal trainer and employed him through June 2007. Andy Pettitte also paid McNamee for his training services during that time.

McNamee’s credentials were never checked by either the Toronto Blue Jays or the NY Yankees. During their employ of his services he was never a certified strength coach. He may have been a personal trainer, but certification is not legally required to be a personal trainer, although such certification only requires an exam and no course work or field training.

McNamee’s credentials are dubious at best, not to mention his phony PhD that he acquired in 2000 from an implicated internet diploma mill known as Columbus University, supposedly located in Louisiana, and since sold off to another entity in another state due to its being nailed by authorities.

McNamee was advertising himself on the internet as Dr. McNamee, PhD in order to market his In-Vite nutritional supplements and his strength training services. He was also getting involved in other enterprises which Clemens was helping to bankroll to help out his career. Although McNamee made claims he was certified, he was not certified as a strength coach until nearly 2006.

According to Dr. Jeff Falkel, Chairman of the Executive Council Certification Commission of the National Strength and Conditioning Association, (NSCA) recently on Will Carroll’s BaseballProspectus.com radio show, stated that McNamee did not even take his Certified Strength Conditioning Specialist exam until October 2005.

And unbelievably, MLB does not require certifications of its personal trainers or strength coaches but does require its staff athletic trainers be licensed only as required by law. The NFL, NBA, NHL and NCAA are also lax about certifications other than athletic trainers who work with medical physicians. They still do not require that their strength trainers be credentialed by the NSCA.

What we can conclude from this unveiling of the lack of professionalism and clubhouse culture throughout MLB is that without the cooperation of all of its participants, from the executive level on down to the groundskeepers, it cannot be trusted to police itself, based upon its putrid record thus far. And the business decisions made on the executive level from Commissioner to owner to GM to player to staff employees has been dismal and in disrepair.

Ultimately, greed has been the prevailing culprit, influencing both owners and players alike. But to single out a few super stars will never cure baseball or professional sports of its ills. It is shortsighted by MLB and not surprisingly so by our U.S. Congress. While there is no ready solution, using some common sense might be a good start.

Copyright ©2008 Diane M. Grassi
Contact: dgrassi@cox.net